CCTV and the 2010 Vancouver Games: Spatial Tactics and Political Strategies by Vonn, Micheal
Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law
Volume 42 | Issue 3
2010
CCTV and the 2010 Vancouver Games: Spatial
Tactics and Political Strategies
Micheal Vonn
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil
Part of the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve
University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Micheal Vonn, CCTV and the 2010 Vancouver Games: Spatial Tactics and Political Strategies, 42 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 595 (2010)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil/vol42/iss3/4
File: Vonn (#4).docx Created on: 5/11/2010 3:34:00 PM Last Printed: 5/11/2010 4:10:00 PM 
595 
CCTV AND THE 2010 VANCOUVER GAMES: SPATIAL TACTICS AND 
POLITICAL STRATEGIES 
Micheal Vonn* 
This paper is a brief discussion of CCTV surveillance of public demonstra-
tions from a legal geography perspective, looking at CCTV as a spatial tac-
tic. This paper focuses on this issue in the context of the 2010 Winter Games 
in Vancouver and comments on the political strategies being used in re-
gards to CCTV for the Olympics and more generally.† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There are many aspects of CCTV that are legitimately contested 
and illustrate various nuances in the use and impact of video surveillance. 
For example, there is research which would indicate that video surveillance 
in a given context may cause fear in some people, yet be a reassurance to 
others.1  
However, almost nobody seems to dispute that cameras aimed at 
protesters are not there for the protestors’ benefit. They are not for the 
protesters’ “safety,” nor to “facilitate” their use of public space. Cameras 
situated primarily for the purpose of capturing expressive activity are not for 
the speakers, but rather are deployed against the speakers.  
There is not much support for any other view and, indeed, even po-
lice organizations concede this point when it is their own ox that is 
gored⎯such as the New York Police Union, which in 2006 sued the City of 
New York for photographing and videoing off-duty officers at a public 
demonstration protesting the pace of their contract talks.2 The police union 
  
 *      Micheal Vonn is a lawyer and the Policy Director of the British Columbia Civil Liber-
ties Association. She has been an Adjunct Professor at the University of British Columbia 
(UBC) Faculty of Law and UBC School of Library, Archival and Information Studies. Ms. 
Vonn is an Advisory Board Member of Privacy International. The author wishes to thank 
Nicholas Blomley for his guidance and assistance.  
 †   This article was written in the run-up to the 2010 Winter Olympics. While appropriately 
1,000 CCTV cameras were put up for the Olympics, the security authority abandoned their 
plans for “free speech zones,” presumably in response to the considerable negative publicity 
and vocalized public concern. 
 1   See, e.g., Nils Zurawski & Stefan Czerwinski, Crime, Maps and Meaning: Views from a 
Survey on Safety and CCTV in Germany, 5 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 51 (2008), available at 
http://www.surveillance-and-society.org/articles5(1)/maps.pdf. 
 2   Jim Dwyer, Surveillance Prompts a Suit: Police v. Police, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2006, at 
A1. 
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claimed that the heavy-handed surveillance tactics which, of course, are 
routinely used at war protests and anti-poverty marches, were a violation of 
the police officers’ rights to free speech.3 Clearly, the visual surveillance 
increasingly being used to monitor public expressive activity has a chilling 
effect that is almost assuredly one of its aims.  
Visual capture makes us much more identifiable in public space to 
authorities and erodes our public anonymity. Our public anonymity is not a 
matter of being unrecognizable, but, as Alan Westin puts it, of being able to 
blend in to the “situational landscape.”4  
The loss of public anonymity affects freedom of speech, freedom of 
assembly, and public politics in general. So CCTV surveillance in the con-
text of public demonstrations affects who says what, and how and where 
they say it.  
This paper is a brief discussion of CCTV surveillance of public 
demonstrations from a legal geography perspective. It specifically looks at 
CCTV as a spatial tactic. This paper focuses on this issue in the context of 
the 2010 Winter Games in Vancouver and comments on the political strate-
gies being used in regards to CCTV for the Olympics and more generally.  
II. CCTV AS A SPATIAL TACTIC 
Legal geography deals with the intersection between space and 
law.5 It highlights the fundamental importance of spatial concepts in the 
law, for example, the critical importance of spatial concepts like property, 
borders and jurisdictions, and the distinction between public and private as a 
foundational organizing principle of most rights theories.6 Legal geography 
unpacks the assumptions about space that are embedded in the law and tries 
to understand these connections.7  
A “spatial tactic” is the “use of space as a strategy and/or technique 
of power and social control.”8 So-called “mega-events” such as the Olym-
pics provide an embarrassment of riches for students of spatial tactics, par-
ticularly those tactics dealing with the policing of public space and the con-
trol of expressive activity. 
  
 3   Id.  
 4   ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 31 (1967). 
 5   See, e.g., NICHOLAS K. BLOMLEY, LAW, SPACE, AND THE GEOGRAPHIES OF POWER 3–6 
(1994). 
 6   See generally id. 
 7   Id. 
 8   Timothy Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, 84 TEX. L. REV. 581, 584 (2006) (quoting 
Setha M. Low & Denise Lawrence-Zúñiga, Locating Culture, in THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF 
SPACE AND PLACE: LOCATING CULTURE 1, 30 (Setha M. Low & Denise Lawrence-Zúñiga 
eds., 2003)). 
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The best primer on spatial tactics and their relationship to public 
speech in the U.S. context is Speech Out of Doors: Preserving First 
Amendment Liberties in Public Places by legal scholar Timothy Zick.9 Zick 
describes how the space needed for democratic discourse, which he terms 
“the expressive topography,” has been dramatically reduced by the steady 
erosion of public space through privatization and development, a vast array 
of spatial tactics of containment and displacement, and First Amendment 
legal doctrine that views space as abstract and fungible.10  
Most people’s understanding of the importance of place, in terms of 
their rights, is pretty crude. We typically use the language of and imagine 
ourselves as “rights-bearing individuals.” It is implicit in this idea that our 
rights go where we go⎯at least in so far as we are in our own coun-
try⎯which is why people are often stunned to discover how ludicrously 
byzantine and non-intuitive the geography of rights actually is.  
For example, in British Columbia we have a type of so-called “safe 
streets” law that seeks to regulate panhandling.11 This is a boilerplate type 
of law that is seen in many jurisdictions.12 It prohibits “solicitation” in cer-
tain zones and makes it illegal, for example, for the Chief of Police to solicit 
donations for the Raise-a-Reader literacy campaign within a certain distance 
of a bus stop or for Brownies to sell their cookies too close to an ATM ma-
chine. And it is not just the Brownies who are unlikely to know this; the 
Chief of Police might also be unaware. The point is that there is little under-
standing of how imperative place is to rights. Place is where power and 
rights are contested. That is what public expression is about.  
However, the more highly “securitized” the place, the less likely it 
is to be a site of spatial contention. Securitization, and particularly visual 
surveillance, has become a commonplace spatial tactic. While the U.K. is 
infamous as the cake-taker regarding public surveillance by CCTV, many 
cities in North America are following in step.13  
Securitization through visual surveillance is often cited as a tech-
nique for displacement, i.e., to discourage the supposedly “criminogenic 
  
 9   TIMOTHY ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORS: PRESERVING FIRST AMENDMENT LIBERTIES IN 
PUBLIC PLACES (2009). 
 10  See id. at 25–64. See also Timothy Zick, Space, Place, and Speech: The Expressive 
Topography, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 439 (2006). 
 11  Safe Streets Act, 2004 S.B.C. (Ca.). 
 12  See, e.g., Safe Streets Act, 1999 S.O. (Ca.) (provincial law from Ontario that bears 
strong resemblance to British Columbia’s Safe Streets Act). 
 13  See NOAM BIALE, EXPERT FINDINGS ON SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS: WHAT CRIMINO-
LOGISTS AND OTHERS STUDYING CAMERAS HAVE FOUND (2008), available at http:// 
youarebeingwatched.us/tools/4/. 
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others” who are the targets of “broken windows”-inflected policing.14 Yet 
much less has been said about the increasing CCTV presence at the tradi-
tional sites of assembly for public expression and contention. Additionally, 
surprisingly little has been said about the use of CCTV in the non-
traditional sites that are specifically designed for protest and surveillance, 
such as the already notorious “free speech zones” currently being built for 
the 2010 Winter Games in Vancouver.15  
III. CCTV AT THE 2010 GAMES 
As Philip Boyle and Kevin Haggerty have pointed out, surveillance 
architecture is not a mere by-product of hosting the Olympics; it is an actual 
“deliverable.”16 It is an explicit “legacy.”17 Just how many CCTV cameras 
would be coming to Vancouver for the 2010 Olympics has been almost im-
possible to determine much in advance of the Games. Academic papers 
have spoken of the near impossibility of getting a straight answer to the 
question of cameras much in advance of the Games.18 Recently, the Inte-
grated Security Unit (ISU) has said that there will be “approximately 900” 
CCTV cameras at venues and “another 50–70 in the urban domain.”19  
As Boyle and Haggerty note, “[s]urveillance should not be narrowly 
construed as simply referring to spies or CCTV cameras. Instead, surveil-
  
 14  DON MITCHELL, THE RIGHT TO THE CITY: SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE FIGHT FOR PUBLIC 
SPACE 199–204 (2003). The “broken windows” thesis of James Q. Wilson and George Kel-
ling argues that crime can be reduced by reducing public “disorder” (symbolized by broken 
windows). See James Q. Wilson & George Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and Neigh-
borhood Safety, ATLANTIC MAG., Mar. 1982, at 29, available at http://www.theatlantic. 
com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/4465/. Broken windows theory has been 
rigorously criticized for, among others things, purporting to justify the criminalization and 
displacement of the public poor. 
 15  2010 Olympic Security Plans Include “Free Speech Areas”, CBC NEWS, July 8, 2009, 
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/british-columbia/story/2009/07/08/bc-olympic-security-plans-free-
speech-areas.html. 
 16  PHILIP J. BOYLE & KEVIN D. HAGGERTY, PRIVACY GAMES: THE VANCOUVER OLYMPICS, 
PRIVACY AND SURVEILLANCE 5 (2009), available at http://www.surveillanceproject.org/sites/ 
default/files/Privacy%20Games.pdf. 
 17  Id. at 13 (quoting Peter J. Ryan, Olympic Security—The Relevance to Homeland Securi-
ty, in OQUIRRH INST., THE 2002 OLYMPIC WINTER GAMES SECURITY LESSONS APPLIED TO 
HOMELAND SECURITY 26 (2002)). 
 18  Laura Huey, The Surveillance Legacy, What Happens to Vancover’s Camera Surveil-
lance Systems After the 2010 Olympics?, in THE SURVEILLANCE PROJECT, A REPORT ON 
CAMERA SURVEILLANCE IN CANADA: PART TWO—SURVEILLANCE CAMERA AWARENESS 
NETWORK (SCAN) 66 (Dec. 2009), available at http://www.sscqueens.org/sites/default/ 
files/SCAN_Report_Phase2_Dec_18_2009.pdf. 
 19  Vancouver 2010 Integrated Security Unit, Frequently Asked Questions [hereinafter 
Integrated Security Unit], http://www.v2010isu.com/ViewPage.action?siteNodeId=516& 
languageId=1&contentId=6821 (last visited Feb. 25, 2010). 
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lance involves collecting and analyzing information about populations in 
order to direct their behavior.”20 Despite the ludicrously low estimate of one 
hundred and seventy-five million dollars for Olympic security,21 the Van-
couver Games security forces have about one billion dollars to put towards 
that effort.22  
We know that the cameras that will be used at the Vancouver 
Olympics venues and so-called “live sites”—which are securitized public 
gathering and entertainment sites in the city centre23—could well capture 
expressive activity should someone, say, unfurl a “Free Tibet” banner in one 
of the chillingly termed “Clean Venues” that are supposed to be free of 
“propaganda” such as political speech.24  
However, aside from incidental capture of speech, the CCTV dep-
loyment that is meant primarily to capture expressive activity is, of course, 
the CCTV that will be aimed at what Olympics officials and security au-
thorities call “free speech zones” or “safe assembly areas” and are popularly 
known as “protest pens.”25  
Protest pens are very clearly and blatantly an infringement of free 
speech. The bizarre semantics around the Vancouver Games’ designated 
protest areas are that the security authorities maintain that they are volunta-
ry, which is true. This begs the question: who then would volunteer to be 
penned? We have to assume that such volunteers are people who do not 
know their rights, and because they do not know that they can legally pro-
test in just about any public place, they are easily corralled into a contained 
area to be readily monitored and recorded. Or these are people who actually 
believe the security authorities’ line that the protest pens constitute an “en-
hanced service.” The “enhanced service” notion is explained as the police 
having scoped out all the good, high visibility venues (“location, location, 
location”) and helpfully providing those venues for the convenience of the 
protesters.26  
  
 20  BOYLE & HAGGERTY, supra note 16, at 8. 
 21  See 2010 Olympic Security Costs Could Hit $1b, Says Minister, CBC NEWS, Oct. 10, 
2008, http://www.cbc.ca/canada/british-columbia/story/2008/10/10/bc-2010-security-costs-
one-billion.html. 
 22  Id. 
 23  GEN. MANAGER OF THE OLYMPIC AND PARALYMPIC OPERATIONS OFFICE ET AL., 2010 
WINTER GAMES LIVE SITE CONCEPT PLAN 3 (Aug. 30, 2007), available at http://vancouver. 
ca/ctyclerk/cclerk/20070918/documents/rr2.pdf. 
 24  IOC REQUIREMENTS ON BRAND PROTECTION AND TICKET TOUTING 2, http://www.culture. 
gov.uk/images/freedom_of_information/AnnexAforCase24489.pdf. 
 25  See, e.g., Clashes Break Out at Summit Protest, CBS NEWS, Aug. 20, 2007, 
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2007/08/20/nafta-summit.html?ref=rss. 
 26  Steve Mertl, No Corrals for 2010 Olympic Protesters, CTV VANCOUVER, Oct. 22, 2009, 
http://www.ctvolympics.ca/news-centre/newsid=17910.html. 
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The Olympics Integrated Security Unit has confirmed that there will 
be protest pens,27 and police say that these pens will have “closer access” to 
the site of the Games than the protesters could achieve elsewhere in public 
space.28 What they have not said⎯but can be determined through other 
means, specifically the timelines for venue construction29⎯is that designat-
ed protest zones are estimated to take eight days for each to be “built.” An 
eight day build would indicate that there is much more than mere fencing 
involved. It is strongly suspected that most of the “build” will be surveil-
lance architecture.  
CCTV, in conjunction with the segregation of protestors, not only 
monitors protest messages and facilitates identification, but also brands the 
protesters as dangerous. It is expected that like some of the highly stigmatiz-
ing designated protest zones that have been created recently in the U.S.,30 
the protest pens at the Vancouver Games are likely to be largely, or even 
entirely, unused. Even if the sites are not used, they will reduce the expres-
sive topography available for protest and stigmatize protesters generally. 
The element of containment, along with highly visible surveillance equip-
ment, is essentially the architecture of fear. Even if it sits empty, the protest 
pen will be a “message” that is sure to get media coverage. This is expen-
sive messaging that is tax-payer sponsored, with the “high tech props” like-
ly re-allocated to domestic policing without any consultation or debate.  
This certainly does not mean that protest outside of the protest pens 
will be surveillance-free. Since security officials can hold cameras or even 
wear body-mounted cameras, protestors who avoid designated protest sites 
will not necessarily elude video surveillance. They are likely to encounter 
mobile video surveillance elsewhere, but they too can hold cameras, and 
they are more likely to be able to hang on to those cameras for their own 
purposes⎯such as police accountability⎯if they are not penned in.  
In addition, since the Vancouver Games will see hundreds of inde-
pendent legal observers deployed by NGOs to monitor the policing of prote-
sters, protesters are apt to be videoed by legal observers as well as by the 
police.31 Therefore, avoiding the protest pens is more realistically an attempt 
to equalize the surveillance equation rather than actually eluding surveil-
lance altogether. 
  
 27   See id. See also Integrated Security Unit, supra note 19. 
 28  See Vancouver Police Department, 2010 Olympic FAQs, http://vancouver.ca/police/ 
index.html (follow “Major Policies and Initiatives” hyperlink; then follow “The VDP and the 
Vancouver 2010 Olympics” hyperlink; then follow “VDP Olympics FAQs” hyperlink) (last 
visited Feb. 25, 2010). 
 29  Venue Commissioning Schedule (on file with author). 
 30  ZICK, supra note 9, at 2. 
 31  Darcy Smith, The Watchers, VANCOUVER MAG., Dec. 1, 2009, http://www.vanmag.com/ 
News_and_Features/City_Life/The_Watchers. 
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There are many reasons why protesters might avoid the protest 
pens, including resisting their implicit messaging. Protest pens, as a spatial 
tactic to contain and stigmatize dissent, are not dependent on CCTV, but 
CCTV is arguably a very important feature of this spatial tactic.  
CCTV is increasingly deployed at those sites where its primary 
function is to capture expressive activity, such as the ever-more common 
CCTV aimed at the traditional speakers’ corner of the public park.32  
I suggest that even a lone camera in such a situation is effect- 
ively a spatial tactic. The camera is proxy for a formal designation of that 
public space as captured by the authorities. In other words, these cameras 
create a de facto protest pen which undermines the function of public space 
as the stage for free assembly by branding public speakers as potentially  
dangerous.  
IV. POLITICS OF CCTV 
The politics of CCTV are substantially evident in the context of the 
Olympics. CCTV installations at “mega-events” are increasingly extensive 
and elaborate and increasingly re-purposed for mundane policing purposes 
post-event. The importing of CCTV for a mega-event essentially endows 
the host city with surveillance infrastructure while sidestepping the political 
grief of justifying the expenditure. The cameras are conveniently available 
for adoption by the host city after the event, and the legacy deals being 
made behind the scenes are very difficult to oppose because it is very diffi-
cult to unearth them ahead of time.  
This is one aspect of what I have referred to as the great CCTV 
shell-game, discussed recently in a paper by Laura Huey. Through a Free-
dom of Information (FOI) request, Huey was able to discover that the Van-
couver Police were in negotiations for Olympic legacy cameras.33 The de-
tails of these negotiations are still very vague, but it is interesting to look  
at how even the fact of the negotiations appear to have been deliberately 
obfuscated.  
Privacy advocates making a similar FOI request to the Vancouver 
Police Department were originally told that the scope of the request needed 
to be narrowed in order to respond in any reasonable timeframe.34 The Van-
couver Police “helpfully” recommended that the request be narrowed to a 
  
 32  See, e.g., Alicia Wong & Kiersten Ow, CCTV Installed at Speakers’ Corner, CHANNEL 
NEWS ASIA, July 25, 2009, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocalnews/ 
view/444612/1/.html. 
 33  Huey, supra note 18, at 67–68. 
 34  Interview by Micheal Vonn with Paul Holden, Member of the British Columbia Civil 
Liberties Association Privacy and Access Committee, in Vancouver (Sept. 2, 2009) (on file 
with author). 
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specific police department in order to expedite the request.35 After a further 
wait of many months, the specific police department that the privacy ad-
vocates were referred to responded with “no records [are] responsive to 
your request.”36  
Privacy advocates note that such apparent institutional efforts to foil 
resistance to CCTV are, unfortunately, extremely common.37 The City of 
Vancouver, for example, was adamant that the CCTV cameras for the live-
sites at the Olympics were going to be “temporary.” 
The [staff] report ask [city] council to accept provincial “funding for the 
deployment of temporary CCTV during the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic 
Winter Games.” The report used the word “temporary” 19 times. Despite 
written assurance, several councilors including COPE Coun. Ellen 
Woodsworth—the lone dissenting vote on council—raised concerns about 
the “temporary” nature of the CCTV plan and the potential erosion of civil 
liberties.38  
The insistence on the “temporariness” of the cameras became increasingly 
shrill as privacy advocates publicly pointed out in the media the incongruity 
of the City building a permanent control center at the City’s emergency 
operations center for its supposedly temporary cameras.39  
Finally, the City was forced to amend its position, saying that when 
it used the language in its various documents and press statement of “tem-
  
 35  Id. 
 36  Id. Cf. Stanley Tromp, Records for 2010 Olympic Games Go Missing, GEORGIA 
STRAIGHT, Apr. 17, 2008, http://www.straight.com/article-141228/olympic-records-go-
missing. The former FOI director Darlene Kotchonoski explained that:  
[S]he had been told by the secretariat [of the Vancouver Organizing Committee for 
the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games (Vanoc)] that it had decided to 
stop recording minutes of its meetings, without explanation. In addition, she added, 
because the ministry can no longer locate any minutes of Vanoc meetings, those 
records cannot be obtained either. (Although Vanoc is not covered by the FOI law, 
the copies of its records it had sent to the ministry had been accessible because the 
ministry itself is covered by the law.). 
Id. 
 37  Huey, supra note 18. 
 38  Mark Hasiuk, City Admits Surveillance Cameras Here to Stay in Vancouver, 
VANCOUVER COURIER, Apr. 7, 2009, http://www2.canada.com/components/print.aspx?id= 
27da28a5-7b85-4ccd-a8fd-bdf0013c6ac5&sponsor= (quoting KEVIN WALLINGER, DIR., 
OFFICE OF EMERGENCY MGMT., EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND PUBLIC SAFETY DURING THE 
2010 OLYMPIC AND PARALYMPIC WINTER GAMES—ACCEPTANCE OF FUNDING FOR 
TEMPORARY CCTV 1 (2009), available at http://vancouver.ca/ctyclerk/cclerk/20090326/ 
documents/csbu7.pdf). 
 39  Hasiuk, supra note 38. 
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porary” cameras, they had, of course, meant “re-deployable” cameras.40 
Permanent “re-deployable” cameras, as it turns out.  
One of the great mysteries of CCTV politics is the question of why 
police and public officials are so often seen using these kinds of obfuscation 
tactics in order to get their hands on CCTV when the vast majority of the 
empirical evidence clearly demonstrates that CCTV has little or no efficacy 
as a security mechanism.41  
A trend that I suggest is worth investigating is how often CCTV 
shows up as a kind of “free prize.” The Olympic legacy cameras are a clear 
example of this, but there are many others. Much of the proliferation of 
CCTV in the U.S. is the result of the lure of funding from the Department of 
Homeland Security.42 We see a similar move in Canada where money is 
made available in special grants from federal and provincial governments 
for cities and municipal transportation systems to get CCTV.43 Therefore, 
not only is there a general failure to debate the merits of CCTV in given 
communities, but there is no cost-benefit analysis because the costs are es-
sentially “laundered” through a different part of government.  
Incidentally, there are many other examples of this funding  
arrangement nullifying assessments of local priorities. This is extremely 
evident, for example, in the surveillance of personal health data. Federal 
government grants support centralized electronic health records systems in 
individual provinces.44 Many of the provinces would undoubtedly spend 
those health dollars in a very different fashion if they could⎯that is, if  
the subsidy were not exclusively for an allocated project, the benefits of 
which are highly contested and for which evidence of deleterious effects are 
growing.45  
  
 40  Hasiuk, supra note 38. 
 41  MARTIN GILL & ANGELA SPRIGGS, BRIT. HOME OFFICE RESEARCH STUDY 292, 
ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF CCTV 61 (2005), available at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/ 
rds/pdfs05/hors292.pdf.  
 42  See ZICK, supra note 9, at 298 (“In fiscal 2006, the Department of Homeland Security 
requested more than $2 billion to finance grants to state and local governments for homeland 
security needs. A substantial portion of those funds were used to purchase and install 
[CCTVs].”). 
 43  See, e.g., Kevin Walby, Little England? The Rise of Open-Street Closed-Circuit Televi-
sion Surveillance in Canada, 4 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 29, 44 (2006), available at www. 
surveillance-and-society.org/Articles4(1)/littleengland.pdf (for example, Brockville, Ontario 
received a $158,000 grant from the province to purchase cameras). 
 44  See generally CAN. HEALTH INFOWAY, ANNUAL REPORT: BUILDING A HEALTHY LEGACY 
TOGETHER (2008–2009), available at http://www2.infoway-inforoute.ca/Documents/ar/ 
Annual_Report_2008-2009_en.pdf. 
 45  See generally OFFICE OF THE INFO. & PRIVACY COMM’R, INVESTIGATION REPORT F10-02: 
REVIEW OF THE ELECTRONIC HEALTH INFORMATION SYSTEM AT VANCOUVER COASTAL 
HEALTH AUTHORITY KNOWN AS THE PRIMARY ACCESS REGIONAL INFORMATION SYSTEM 
(“PARIS”) (2010), available at http://www.oipc.bc.ca/orders/investigation_reports/ 
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In these types of situations, the political equation is not a question 
of this project versus another more important, more meritorious project. The 
political equation is money for this initiative or no money at all. Presuma-
bly, this is a significant factor in the question of why politicians and security 
authorities are so ready to go to the wall for CCTV systems that the most 
cursory research would show will not increase safety and will not reduce 
crime.46  
Since it is “free money,” it does not really matter if there is no re-
turn on the investment. This, I suggest, is increasingly becoming an insi-
dious form of internal policy laundering and the primary means of quashing 
meaningful debate on CCTV and other surveillance systems.  
As a final note on the politics of CCTV, part of the wonder of the 
preparations for the Winter Games in Vancouver is what appears to be the 
brazen illegality of so many of the public control measures demanded by the 
International Olympic Committee.  
The City of Vancouver was forced to reassess the legal wisdom of 
some of its Olympics bylaws in light of a constitutional challenge⎯bylaws, 
for example, prohibiting “non-celebratory” signage.47 The legal challenge to 
the Olympics by-laws has garnered considerable media attention.48 Howev-
er, unlike the Olympics by-laws, which are definitely controversial, there 
are other security measures for the Olympics that appear to be entirely ac-
cepted and taken for granted which might also be vulnerable to constitution-
al challenge.  
Wes Pue and Rob Diab recently published a paper about how in 
Canada there is no statutory or common law authority for the police to 
create special “securitized zones” and “security perimeters.”49 Many people 
might argue that it would be impossible to police an event such as the 
Olympic Games without the legal authority to create securitized zones. The 
point is that currently there does not actually seem to be any such authority.  
Similarly with CCTV, there are public spaces that will be blanketed 
with CCTV during the Vancouver Games, and virtually no one is surprised 
  
InvestigationReportF10-02.pdf; ROSS ANDERSON ET AL., DATABASE STATE (2009), available 
at http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/database-state.pdf. 
 46  See, e.g., GILL & SPRIGGS, supra note 41. 
 47  Posting of Geoff Dembicki to the Hook, http://thetyee.ca/Blogs/TheHook/Olympics 
2010/2009/11/26/bylaw-changes-free-speech/ (Nov. 26, 2009, 14:32).  
 48  See, e.g., Vancouver’s Worrying Civil Liberties Rollback, MCGILL TRIB., Oct. 14, 2009, 
http://media.www.mcgilltribune.com/media/storage/paper234/news/2009/10/14/Opinion/Edit
orial.Vancouvers.Worrying.Civil.Liberties.Rollback-3802696.shtml. 
 49  Robert Diab & Wesley Pue, Security for the 2010 Olympics: British Columbia Needs a 
“Public Order Policing Act” 1–2 (July 22, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with UBC 
and Capilano University), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=1388602. 
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by that. Yet there is very little case law that would guide us in determining 
if or when such sweeping public surveillance is permissible under the Cana-
dian Constitution. The practice makes it seem like this issue of constitutio-
nality must have been settled, but in fact it is not.  
V. CONCLUSION 
For various reasons, going after the Olympic CCTV cameras on a 
constitutional question is almost assuredly a loser and bound to make very 
bad law. The security rationale is very apt to be found by a court to be too 
compelling in that context, but I suggest that the legacy cameras may be 
ripe for challenge, and the ideal challenge is almost certainly aimed at cam-
eras that are primarily situated to capture expressive content. This constitu-
tional challenge could be brought on the grounds not only of section 8 rights 
to be free of unreasonable search and seizure, but also sections 2(b) and (d) 
rights to freedom of expression and of association.50 The use of CCTV as a 
spatial tactic to chill public expression is ripe for both legal and theoretical 
exploration.  
 
  
 50  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, 
arts. 2(b), (d), 8 (U.K.). 
